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ANN C. HODGES*

Bargaining for Privacy in the Unionized
Workplace

Abstract: This article considers whether collective bargaining can enhance privacy protection for employees in the United States. Employers are increasingly
engaging in practices that invade employee privacy with few existing legal protections to limit their actions. While data on the extent of bargaining about privacy is limited, it appears that unions in the U.S. have primarily used the grievance and arbitration procedure to challenge invasions of privacy that lead to
discipline of the employee instead of negotiating explicit contractual privacy
rights. In contrast to the U.S., labor representatives in many other countries, particularly in the European Union, have greater legal rights of consultation with
employers and take a more proactive approach to protection of employee privacy. While this approach offers promise for achieving greater privacy for employees and more flexibility for employers, the article concludes that it is unlikely to
be widely adopted in the U.S. because of the limited power of labor unions.

1.

INTRODUCTION

With the events of September 11, 2001, the focus of the nation shifted to
national security and prevention of additional attack. The swiftly enacted
USA Patriot Actl provided the government with sweeping powers of

*

Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank my colleagues Daniel T.
Murphy and Porcher L. Taylor, III, both of the University of Richmond, and Maurizio
Del Conte, Professore Associato, Bocconi University for their comments on earlier
drafts and Luke P. Wright, for his helpful research assistance.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-156.
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investigation and surveillance in order to provide protection from terrorism. Although passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of
Congress, the Patriot Act quickly generated criticism from civil libertarians and privacy advocates. The confluence of the Patriot Act with the
advancements in technology that render monitoring of citizens and
employees infinitely easier and cheaper makes the focus on workplace
privacy particularly timely.
While we purport to place a high value on privacy in the United
States, actual protection of privacy is quite limited. Few can afford to live
without employment, yet our right to privacy in the workplace is more
circumscribed than in most other spheres of public life. Legitimate
employer interests justify some intrusions on employee privacy. Yet many
scholars have suggested that greater protection of employee privacy is
warranted and is likely to come only by additional legislation.2
In many other countries, stronger legislative protection for employee
privacy exists. In addition, worker representatives in other countries often
bargain for privacy protection for workers. While many of the most salient
privacy issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining, U.S. unions do not
appear to have placed significant priority on many privacy issues in bargaining. Negotiated privacy protections offer some advantages over legislation. Yet given the shrinking percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, such protection may not reach many workers.
This paper considers collective bargaining as a possible avenue for
increased privacy protection for workers. Section 2 reviews briefly current
employer practices that raise privacy concerns, along with existing legal
protection for privacy in the workplace. Section 3 looks at the most significant current issues regarding employee privacy and concludes that most
are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act, at least as they apply to employees rather than applicants for employment, and probably under many state collective bargaining laws as well.
Section 4 looks at the context in which privacy issues have arisen in the
unionized workplace, as well as the information that exists on the extent

2

See, e.g., M. W. Fink.in, 'Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law', U
Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L., Vol. 7, 2005, p. 279, pp. 280-281; S. E. Wilborn, 'Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace', Ga. L. Rev., Vol.
32, 1998, p. 825, pp. 879-880. Cf W. R. Corbett, 'The Need for a Revitalized Common
Law of the Workplace', Brook. L. Rev., Vol. 69, 2003, p. 91 (arguing for revitalization
of common law rather than legislation to address issues of electronic monitoring and
genetic discrimination). But see C. Pearson-Fazekas, '1984 Is Still Fiction: Electronic
Monitoring in the Workplace and U.S. Privacy Law', Duke L. & Tech. Rev., No. 15, 2004
(arguing that existing law is sufficient, employee privacy rights in the workplace are limited, and there is little incentive for employer abuse).
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to which privacy protections have been incorporated in collective bargaining agreements. Section 5 looks at the international data on privacy and
collective bargaining. Section 6 concludes that collective bargaining
would be an effective way to provide additional privacy protection for
employees, but since so few employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements, this solution is of limited utility in the U.S. today.

2.

EXISTING PRACTICE AND EXISTING LAW

The agenda for the conference illustrates the foremost privacy issues in
today's workplace - electronic monitoring, privacy of medical and other
employee records, medical, genetic and drug testing, and other restrictions on off-duty conduct. In recent years much of the focus has been on
electronic monitoring, as technology has enabled employers to engage in
constant supervision of employees at work, as well as to access employees' electronic communications. Among the most current issues are the
employer's use of employee-tracking technology to monitor employees
and employer restrictions on employee blogs.3 While there is no dispute
that employers have the right to monitor employees to ensure that they are
engaging in productive work and not violating workplace rules, the ability to conduct constant monitoring with electronic technology has altered
the nature of supervision.4 As the technology enabling such monitoring
has decreased in cost, monitoring has increased and, according to critics,
raised employee stress levels.s Technology has also increased the ability
of employers to engage in genetic testing and discrimination, bringing
this issue to the forefront of the concerns of privacy advocates.6

3

4

5
6

See 'Technology Issues Outpace Guidance From NLRB, Attorneys Tell ABA
Conference', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 46, March 10, 2005; 'Employee Tracking
Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee Backlash', Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004; T. Zeller, Jr., 'When the Blogger Biogs, Can the
Employer Intervene', N. Y. Times, April 18, 2005, at CI; J. Boog, 'Employers Wrestle
with "Blogosphere'", Nat'/ L.J., April 4, 2005, p. 5.
For example, employers are using tracking systems on company vehicles to monitor
employee location, driving speed, and time of stops. See 'Employee Tracking
Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee Backlash', Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004. Identification badges are used directly on employees to determine how long employees spend on particular tasks and in certain locations.
See id. Cell phones and handheld computers can also be used to track employees. See
id. Employers are even using infrared technology on bathroom sinks and soap dispensers to see how long employees spend washing their hands. See id.
W.R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, pp. 102-103.
/d.,pp.104-105.
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2.1. Current Practice
Employers investigate and monitor employees for several legitimate reasons. Employers seek to hire and retain those workers who will be most
productive. They want to be sure that employees are working effectively
and efficiently. 7 Employers want healthy employees who are less likely to
be absent or impose high health insurance costs. In addition, employers
are concerned about potential liability for injury to employees or injury
to third parties. s Further, employers desire to prevent loss of confidential
information and breaches of computer security.9 Finally, where some
problem occurs, missing inventory for example, employers investigate to
determine the cause of the loss. All of these matters have the potential to
affect the employer's profitability, thus spurring substantial employer
concern. Despite the legitimacy of employer motives, 10 however, employer practices intrude on employee privacy interests. Employees have an
interest in protecting and controlling the use of personal information
about them. I I Additionally, employees have a privacy interest in engaging in some kinds of behavior free from regulation or surveillance.12
These privacy interests clash with legitimate employer interests in ensuring productivity, preventing liability, and protecting the company from
loss, necessitating some reconciliation by law or agreement.
According to an American Management Association study in 2001,
82.2 per cent of major U.S. employers are 'actively recording and/or
reviewing employee communication and behavior in the workplace' using

7
8

9

I0

11
12

It has been estimated that 'cyber-loafing', employees surfing the internet at work, costs

businesses $54 billion per year. 'Workers, Surf at Your Own Risk', Bus. Wk., June 12,
2000, p. 105.
Some companies have settled sexual harassment suits based on e-mails at the cost of
several million dollars, while others have fired employees who sent sexually offensive
e-mails, presumably to avoid such claims. See 'Workers, Surf at Your Own Risk', op.
cit., supra note 7, p. 105.
Indeed, employer concerns about privacy of employee, customer or citizen data may
prompt monitoring or restrictions on the use of certain technologies. See TLK2UL8R:
The Privacy Implications of Instant and Text Messaging Technologies in State Government, Research Brief, National Association of State Chief Information Officers, 2005,
pp. 6-7, available at <http://www.nascio.org/nascioCommittees/privacy/instantMessaging
Brief.pdf> (last visited September 29, 2005).
Certainly, there are improper motives for employer monitoring as well, including curiosity, voyeurism, and a desire to interfere with employee efforts to unionize. See D. R.
Nolan, 'Privacy and Profitability in the Technological Workplace', J. Lab. Res., Vol. 24,
2003,pp.207,215-216.
R. L. Belair, Employee Rights to Privacy, Proceedings of New York University ThirtyThird Annual National Conference on Labor, 1981, pp. 3-4.
Id.
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electronic monitoring.13 Monitoring increased dramatically in the short
time between 1997 and 2001. For example, '[i]n 2001, 36.l per cent of
firms reporting monitored computer files, compared to 13. 7 per cent in
1997; 46.5 per cent monitored e-mail in 2001, compared to 14.9 per cent
in 1997.' 14 The 2005 AMA survey on electronic monitoring and surveillance shows that monitoring has continued to increase since 2001.15
Seventy-six per cent of employers surveyed monitor employees' web site
connections, while 36 per cent track 'content, keystrokes and time spent
at the keyboard.'16 Fifty per cent of employers kept and reviewed employees' computer files and 55 per cent stored and reviewed employees' email.17 Twenty-five per cent of employers had terminated an employee
for violating e-mail policy.18 Over 80 per cent of employers notified the
employees of monitoring and retention of files.19
Monitoring of telephone conversations and video surveillance also
increased dramatically. The percentage of employers monitoring employee phone usage and tracking the phone numbers called increased from 9
per cent in 2001 to 51 per cent in 2005.20 In 2001 only 9 per cent of
employers surveyed taped employee phone calls, while 19 per cent taped
calls of at least some employees in 2005 and 3 per cent taped calls of all
employees.21 The percentage of employers using video monitoring to
detect theft, violence and sabotage jumped from 33 per cent in 2001 to
51 per cent in 2005.22 Monitoring for performance also has increased,
with 10 per cent of employers videotaping some employees and 6 per
cent taping all employees.23 As for existing policies, the following per-

13

14
15

16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23

R. Bigler and W. Petzel, 'Employer Snooping: What Rights Do Workers Really Have?',
Feb. 13, 2002, available at <http://www.lraonline.org/print.php?id=98>, citing the
American Management Association Study.
M. W. Finkin, 'Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The United States Law',
Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'yJ., Vol. 23, 2002, pp. 471-474.
American Management Association, 2005 Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance
Survey, 2005, available at <http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS_sumrnary05.pdf
>(last visited September 29, 2005) (hereinafter 'AMA, 2005 Survey').
Id. The survey consisted of 526 employers of various sizes. Id.
Id. In a 2004 survey of840 employers, 60 per cent monitored external e-mail using software.
See American Management Association, 2004 Workplace E-Mail and Instant Messaging
available
at
http://www.amanet.org/research/
Survey
Summary,
pdfs/IM_2004_Summary.pdf> (last visited May 6, 2005) (hereinafter 'AMA, 2004 Survey').
Id. The same percentage reported terminations for e-mail use and terminations for internet abuse in the 2005 survey. AMA, 2005 Survey.
AMA, 2005 Survey.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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centages of employers reported maintaining the specified policies: personal e-mail use - 84 per cent; personal internet use - 81 per cent; personal instant messenger use - 42 per cent; operation of personal web sites
on company time - 34 per cent; personal postings on corporate biogs 23 per cent; and operating personal biogs on work time - 20 per cent.24
Employers have been slower to adopt monitoring in newly emerging
areas of technology.25 As of 2004, only 11.1 per cent of responding
employers used software to manage instant messaging.26 As for global
positioning technology, 5 per cent of responding employers in 2005 used
it to monitor cell phones, 8 per cent to keep track of company vehicles,
and 8 per cent to monitor employee id cards.27 Fifty-three percent of
employers used such technology 'to control physical security and access
to buildings and data centers.'28 Fingerprint scans were used by 5 per cent
of employers, facial recognition technology by 2 per cent of employers
and iris scans by 0.5 per cent of employers.29
A 2004 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management
revealed that employers most often monitor computer use and internet
use.30 On the other hand, the employers rarely engaged in desk searches,
opened postal mail, or listened to employee phone conversations.31 About
one quarter of employers frequently used electronic identification cards
to monitor employee movement, while fewer used cameras to do so on a
frequent basis. 32 A Government Accounting Office study of 14 large
employers found that all routinely store information on employees' computer activity.33 Eight of the companies used the files to investigate

24
25
26

27
28

29
30

31
32
33

Id.
Id.
AMA, 2004 Survey. A number of respondents, 28.4 per cent, however, were unsure if
their employer used software to monitor instant messaging. Id.
AMA, 2005 Survey.
Id. These access cards can be used to monitor employee location in the building also,
which raises privacy concerns. See E. Balkovich, T. K. Bikson, and G. Bitko, 9 to 5; 'Do
You Know ifYour Boss Knows Where You Are?', 2, Rand Corp., 2005, pp. 16, available
at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TRl 97 .pdf> (last visited
September 29, 2005)(hereinafter 'Rand Study').
AMA, 2005 Survey.
SHRM Research, Workplace Privacy, p. 21, January 2005, available at
<http://www.shrm.org/surveys/Workplace%20Privacy%20Poll%20Findings%20%20A%20Study%20by%20SHRM%20and%20CareerJoumal.com.pdf>. Large organizations engaged in more monitoring than smaller ones. Id., p. 22.
Id.,p.21.
Id., pp. 19-20.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Employee Privacy: Computer-Use Monitoring
Practices and Policies of Selected Companies, GA0-02-717, September 27, 2002, available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02717.pdf> (Last visited May 6, 2005) (hereinafter 'GAO Report').
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reports of employee violations of company policies, while six regularly
reviewed employee computer activity to determine whether any violations had occurred.34 A Rand Study of six employers using radio-frequency identification cards for employee access in the workplace demonstrated that cards were used not only for access but also for the collection
and retention of personally identifiable data regarding employee movement. 35 Five of the six organizations used such data to investigate incidents such as theft or other alleged misconduct or to determine compliance with work rules.36 In three organizations, the data was available not
only to security departments but also to other departments such as human
resources, legal and line management.37 None of the organizations had a
policy regarding the use of the system which was provided to all employees, thus limiting employee knowledge.38 The authors concluded that privacy was of low priority to the organizations, subordinate to security,
investigation, emergency procedures and employment policies.39
An AMA study on medical testing in 2004 revealed that 63 per cent
of the responding companies required medical testing of new hires,
employees, or both.40 Most of the testing was for illegal substances or fitness for duty, with about 15.1 per cent of companies testing for susceptibility to workplace hazards. 41 Drug testing and fitness-for-duty testing
have decreased since 1995 and 1997 respectively, while testing for HIV
peaked in 1997 and has decreased since.42 A small percentage of employers appear to engage in genetic testing, with breast/colon cancer, sicklecell anemia, and Huntington's Disease listed as reasons for testing.43

2.2. Legal Restrictions
Legal restrictions on employers whose investigative and monitoring tactics infringe on employee privacy are limited. The Employee Polygraph

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41
42
43

Id., p. 3.
Rand Study, op. cit., supra note 28, p. 12.
Id.
Id.
Id., pp. 14, 15, 16.
Id., p. 16.
American Management Association, AMA 2004 Workplace Testing Survey: Medical
Testing, available at <http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/Medical_testing_04.pdt>
(last visited September 29, 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Protection Act restricts the use of polygraph exams,44 and many states
also have polygraph laws4s with the more protective state laws superseding the federal.46 The Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA') limits the
ability of covered employers to require medical exams.47 For employees,
exams must be job-related. 48 For applicants, exams can be required only
after a conditional job offer has been made, and any disqualification
based on the exam must be job-related.49 In addition, medical records
must be kept confidential and separate from other personnel records.so
Drug tests, however, are excluded from these ADA restrictions.SI Some
states have passed laws regulating drug testing in various ways, but none
prohibit testing.s2 Also, in recent years, a number of states have enacted
legislation either preventing employers from requiring genetic testing, or
limiting the use of the results of such tests.s3 President Clinton issued
Executive Order 13145 which limits disclosure of genetic information
and prohibits discrimination based on genetic information in federal
employment. S4 In addition, the EEOC interprets the ADA to prohibit

44

45

46
47
48
49
50

51

52
53

54

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009. The Polygraph Act contains exemptions for government
employers and some private employers involved in the security, national defense and
pharmaceutical industries, however. See 29 U.S.C. §2006.
For a listing of state laws, see M. W. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law, (2d ed.), 2003,
pp. 490-540. For discussion of state law restrictions on polygraphs, see H. D. Kelly, Jr.
& W. A. Herbert, When James Bond Enters the Workplace: Uses and Abuses of
Technology -A Guide for In-House Counsel and Litigators, 2004, pp. 31-32, available
at <http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2004/kelly.doc>, (last visited June 8,
2005).
See 29 U.S.C. § 2009 (providing that the law does not preempt more restrictive state
laws or collective bargaining agreements.)
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2),(3).
42 U.S.C. § 12 J 12(d)(3)(8). HIPAA regulations also deal with the privacy of medical
records but apply to employers only when they act in the capacity of plan sponsors under
ERISA. See M. Finkin, supra note 45, at pp. 44-45.
42 U.S.C. § 12114(d). Indeed various federal agencies require drug testing of employees in certain industries. See, e.g., Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, 49
U.S.C. §§ 45101-45106 (requiring drug testing of employees in the transportation industry.) Also, the Drug Free Workplace Act requires federal grantees to maintain drug free
workplaces. 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
M.A. Rothstein and L. Liebman, Employment Law, (5th ed.), 2003, p. 241. For a comprehensive listing of such laws, see M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 542-690.
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 22, 791-822; W. R. Corbett, op. cit., supra, note
2, p. 113; W. A. Herbert, The NLRA in a Technological Society: A Law Not Busy Being
Born, Is Busy Dying, 2005, pp. 13-17 (copy on file with the author).
Exec. Order No. 13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
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genetic discrimination.SS Finally some states protect employee personnel
files from disclosure and/or provide employee access to the information
contained there.S6
In addition to specific legislation, most states have either a common
law or statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy. The reasonable
expectation of privacy has been imported from the constitutional context
into both common law and statutory privacy contexts.s7 Thus, if employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, any invasion of privacy is lawful. The incentive then is for employers to defeat the expectation of privacy by either employment rule or requiring employee consent
to searches as a condition of employment.SS It is rare that employees are
able to challenge employer infringements on privacy successfully using
the common law. s9
Regarding technological monitoring, as Professor Finkin states in his
article detailing the U.S. law on workplace privacy and information technology, ' [d]espite the wealth of legal thought, the state of the law in the
United States relevant to the topic addressed here has been put in one
short sentence: "No successful standards, legal or otherwise, exist in the
United States for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data
in cyberspace."'60 In addition to the common law, two federal statutes, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Stored
Communications Act, limit data collection and interception of communications, but exceptions permit most employer monitoring of employees

55

56
57
58
59

60

W. R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, p. 113. It is not clear, however, that courts will
defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute. Id. The EEOC brought a claim against
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company challenging genetic testing based
on the ADA and reached a settlement with the company providing $2.2 million to the
tested workers. 'EEOC's First Genetic Testing Challenge Settled for $2.2 Million,
Parties Announce', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 90, at A-1 (May 9, 2002).
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 717-756.
D.R. Nolan, op. cit., supra note 10, p. 220.
Id., p. 221.
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, at xxviii. Egregious cases may be the exception to
this rule. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals recently allowed a state Jaw invasion of privacy claim to proceed to trial where the employer allegedly utilized video surveillance in the women's restroom for over two years in response to a rumor that drug
dealing was occurring in the restroom. Johnson v. Allen, 2005 Ga. App. Lexis 311. For
further discussion of cases in which employees have been successful in common law
invasion of privacy cases, see H. D. Kelly and W. A. l-{erbert, op. cit., supra note 45, pp.
6-8, 17-18.
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, p. 471, quoting P. Schwartz, Privacy, Participation,
and Cyberspace: An American Perspective, in Zur Autonomie des lndividuums: Liber
Amicorum Spiros Simitis, D. Simon and M. Weiss (eds.), 2000, pp. 337-338.
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who use the employer's communication systems.61 A few state laws
require that notice of monitoring be given to the employees.62
Additionally, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits employer surveillance of union or protected concerted activity.63
There is also a group of state statutes that protect employees' rights
to engage in certain lawful activities while off-duty. Most of the laws protect employees' right to use tobacco products, but some extend to alcohol, some to use of any lawful product, and a few to other lawful activities.64 Some of these laws have exceptions allowing employers to limit
employee rights for job related reasons.65 In the absence of these statutory restrictions, employers may lawfully refuse to hire or terminate
employees for off-duty conduct, so long as they do not violate any other
legal limitation such as discrimination laws or constitutional rights.66

61

62

63
64

65
66

D.R. Nolan, op. cit., supra, note 10, pp. 224-25. One of the exceptions is consent. Id.
An employer could require employees to consent to any and all monitoring, thus bringing its actions within the statutory exception while at same time defeating any expectation of privacy at common law.
See D. R Nolan, op. cit., supra note 10, p. 225; M. Finkin, supra note 14, pp. 477-478;
M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 757-762. Some states also have laws similar to
ECPA, but they generally contain the same exceptions. D. R. Nolan, op. cit., supra note
10, p. 225.
The Developing Labor Law, (4th ed.), P. Hardin and J.E. Higgins, Jr., (eds.), 2001, p. 162.
See M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 45, pp. 113-114, 691-716. For a discussion of these
laws as they relate to romantic relationships, see S. Stiller, 'Statutes Limiting
Regulation of Workplace Romances', Arbitration 1998: The Changing World ofDispute
Resolution, Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators, p. 22, 1999. Notably, an office romance recently led to the termination of
Boeing's CEO, although the use of the company's computers to send romantic e-mails
and the company's image concerns suggest that the situation might not fall into the category of off-duty conduct with no impact on employment. See 'The End of the Office
Affair? Face Value', The Economist, March 12, 2005, p. 64.
See M. Finkin, op. cit., supra, note 45, pp. 113-114.
Discrimination laws protect employees from discrimination on the basis of religion,
unless the employee's belief or practice cannot be reasonably accommodated, pregnancy, and in some states, political affiliation and marital status. See M. Finkin, op. cit.,
supra note 45, pp. 367-380, 391-393, 397-398. In the public sector, there also may be
constitutional restrictions on termination or discrimination based on, inter alia, political
affiliation, religious belief, and protected speech. See, e.g., Barrow v. Greenville Indep.
Sch. Dist., 332 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing constitutionally protected privacy
right to direct education of children including enrolling them in private school); 'Jury
Awards $35,455 to Teacher Denied Job Because Her Children Attend Private School',
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (ENA), Vol. 43, p. 2105, at p. 413 (April 26, 2005) (reporting on
favorable jury verdict for Barrow); Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding that college did not violate speech and associational rights of teacher by refusing to renew her contract because of her attendance at a WTO protest rally with some
of her students).
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This would include employee blogging and participation m computer
chat rooms. 67
Public-sector employees have more protection than private-sector
employees by virtue of the Constitution, which establishes the right of
privacy as fundamental.68 Based on the right of privacy, public employees may limit employer inquiries into their private lives.69 Also, the
Fourth Amendment has been applied to drug testing and other workplace
searches.70 Workplace searches are subjected to a different test than those
conducted for law enforcement purposes, however.7 1 First, the employee
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy and then a balancing test
is applied to determine whether legitimate employer interests outweigh
the employee's privacy interests.72 Under this standard, governmental
drug testing has been upheld in a number of employment contexts, but

67
68

69

70

71

72

M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, pp. 486-488.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Enforcement of constitutional
privacy rights may not be easy, however. See, e.g., Giaccio v. City of New York, 16 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 653 (2005) (dismissing city employee's constitutional privacy
claim based on release of drug and alcohol test results to the media because plaintiff did
not allege that the action occurred as a result of a policy or practice of the municipality
as required for an action under Section 1983). See also City of Sherman v. Henry, 928
S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156 (1997) (finding that refusal to promote employee based on his affair with the wife of a fellow officer does not violate privacy rights under the U.S. or Texas constitutions).
Wilborn, supra note 2, at 866 & n.155. The Privacy Act also provides some protection
to federal employees. See United States Dep 't of Defense v. Fed 'I Lab. Rel. Au th., 510
U.S. 487 (1994) (holding that Privacy Act bars disclosure of employees' home addresses to requesting unions). Claims of violation of the Privacy Act have been brought in
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees, Local R4-27 and U.S., Dep't of Defense, 60 FLRA No. 5 (2004)(upholding
arbitrator's decision that Privacy Act was not violated by agency that contacted employee's medical provider to discuss recommended work schedule). As in U.S. Dep 't of
Defense v. FLRA, supra, the Privacy Act may be used to prevent unions from obtaining
information for purposes of collective bargaining. See U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 51
FLRA 599 ( 1996) ( holding that Privacy Act barred disclosure of employee performance
ratings and awards by name to union). But See Department of the Air Force v. Fed'! Lab.
Rel. Auth., 104 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding supervisor's privacy interest did not
outweigh the union's need for copy of letter disciplining supervisor to determine
whether to proceed with grievance).
See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Psychological testing is not considered a search under
the Fourth Amendment, however. See Greenawalt v. Indiana Dep 't of Corrections, 397
F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Court in Von Raab noted that 'requiring a warrant in this context would serve only
to divert valuable agency resources from the Service's primary mission.' 489 U.S. at
666-667.
See NTEU v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-666.
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limited in others. 73 The result typically depends on the jobs of the
employees being tested and the nature of the testing. Like drug testing
cases, cases applying the Fourth Amendment to electronic monitoring
and computer file searches have mixed results, some finding violations
of privacy rights and others allowing monitoring or searches.74

2.3 Proposed Legislation
Despite agitation over the lack of workplace privacy, enactment of any
comprehensive legislation seems remote. Privacy advocates have lobbied
for legislation at the state and federal levels with limited success.75 The
two exceptions have been in the area of genetic information and tobacco
use, the former probably attributable to deep public concern over the use
of genetic information and the latter to the strength of the tobacco lobby.
As Professor Finkin has noted, privacy legislation in the U.S. tends to be
limited and enacted in direct response to particular perceived problems. 76
Outside those contexts, employees in the private sector nonunion workplace have limited protection for privacy interests, while employees in the
public sector have greater but still limited protection. But what of the
unionized workplace? Are conditions there any different?

73

74

75

76

See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers
of Am. v. Fink, 385 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge
to random drug testing of employees carrying firearms, health care workers caring for
individuals in state care, corrections employees with unsupervised access to prisoners,
probationers or parolees, and employees with unsupervised access to controlled substances), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1972 (2005). Notably, this challenge was brought by
the union to the testing program incorporated in its collective bargaining agreement
with the state. 385 F.3d at 1006.
Compare Varnado v. Department of Employment and Training, 687 So. 2d I 013, I 0241030 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(finding search of employee's files on state-owned computer
violated employee's reasonable expectation of privacy) and State v. Bonnell, 856 P.2d
1265, 1273 n.5 (Haw. 1993) (finding violation of Hawaii constitutional provision comparable to the Fourth Amendment based on video surveillance of the employees' break
room) with Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174 (!st Cir. 1997)
(allowing video surveillance of workplace); Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass 'n
v. Sacramento County, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1996) (same) and Biby v Board
ofRegents, University ofNebraska, 419 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding employee had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where employer's computer
policy informed employees that university could search files for legitimate reasons).
See D. R. Nolan, supra note I 0, p. 227 (discussing proposed federal legislation). Most
recently, legislation has been introduced to protect employee privacy in changing areas.
See Employee Changing Room Privacy Act, H.R. 582, introduced by Rep. Tom Petri (RWis.) and Rep. Rob Andrews (D-N.J.).
M. Finkin, supra note 14, pp. 472-473.
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PRIVACY AS A MANDATORY BARGAINING SUBJECT

Under the National Labor Relations Act, employers are required to bargain only over mandatory subjects of bargaining.77 The NLRB has held
that both medical exams and drug testing of employees are mandatory
subjects of bargaining.78 The same is true of the installation of video surveillance cameras. 79 In finding video surveillance to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Board stated:
[T]he installation of surveillance cameras is both germane to the
working environment, and outside the scope of managerial decisions lying at the core of entrepreneurial control.
As to the first factor - germane to the working environment the installation of surveillance cameras is analogous to physical
examinations, drug/alcohol testing requirements, and polygraph
testing, all of which the Board has found to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. They are all investigatory tools or methods
used by an employer to ascertain whether any of its employees
has engaged in misconduct.
The Respondent implemented the installation and use of surveillance cameras because of an increase in workplace theft and
other suspected employee misconduct in the facility, such as
reports of employees sleeping instead of working. The Respondent
acknowledges that employees caught involved in theft and/or other
misconduct are subject to discipline, including discharge.
Accordingly, the installation and use of surveillance cameras has
the potential to affect the continued employment of employees
whose actions are being monitored.

77
78
79

NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
See Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., 273 NLRB 171, 177 (1984)(medical exams); JohnsonBateman Co., 295 NLRB 180 (1989) (drug testing).
See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB 515 (1997). Accord, National Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2003)(ordering employer to provide union with information regarding hidden security cameras and negotiate about confidentiality protections);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 NLRB No. 49 (2004), enf'd sub. nom, Brewers and Maltsters
Local 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(finding employer violated NLRA by failing to bargain with union prior to installation of hidden surveillance cameras in area
used for work and breaks, and by refusing to supply information to the union about the
use and installation of the cameras).
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Further, as the judge finds, the use of surveillance cameras in
the restroom and fitness center raises privacy concerns which
add to the potential effect upon employees. We agree that these
areas are part of the work environment and that the use of hidden cameras in these areas raises privacy concerns which
impinged upon the employees' working conditions. The use of
cameras in these or similar circumstances is unquestionably germane to the working environment ...
The installation and use of surveillance cameras in the workplace are not among that class of managerial decisions that lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control. The use of surveillance cameras is not entrepreneurial in character, is not fundamental to the
basic direction of the enterprise, and impinges directly upon
employment security. It is a change in the Respondent's methods
used to reduce workplace theft or detect other suspected employee misconduct with serious implications for its employees' job
security, which in no way touches on the discretionary 'core of
entrepreneurial control.' (footnotes omitted).80
Although the Board has not ruled on whether other forms of electronic
monitoring are mandatory bargaining subjects, it seems likely that the
rationale of Colgate-Palmolive would apply, leading the Board to find
that bargaining is required. Similarly, since genetic testing is a form of
medical testing, it is probable that the Board would conclude that bargaining over such testing is required. It also seems likely that most
restrictions on off-duty conduct such as smoking, alcohol, and fraternization would be conditions of employment subject to bargaining. Unions
are generally only entitled to demand bargaining over these issues as they
impact current employees, however. In Star Tribune, the Board concluded that hiring practices are not negotiable unless they vitally affect the
terms and conditions of employment of the employees. 81
Another factor which may affect the bargaining obligation is whether
the employer's implementation of a new system implicating privacy
rights is in fact a change in working conditions. If not, bargaining will not
be required. The Board has addressed this issue in several cases. In Rust
Craft Broadcasting, 82 the Board concluded that the change from manual
timekeeping to mechanical timekeeping was not an unlawful unilateral

80
81
82

Colgate-Palmolive, 323 NLRB at 515-516.
295 NLRB 543 (1989).
225 NLRB 327 (I 976).
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change because it was merely a different method of recording time. A
change from a time clock to supervisory recording of employees' work
time required bargaining, however.83 Because of the involvement of
supervisors in direct monitoring and the employees' inability to check the
accuracy of the records, the new system was a significant change. 84 In
2001, an administrative law judge found that a change from signing in
and out to a biometric system using fingerprints was more like the former than the latter, and no bargaining was required. 85 In reaching that
conclusion, the judge distinguished the case from Vincent, finding that no
more supervisory oversight was involved and there was no evidence that
employees could not check the accuracy of their records. 86 Further the
judge noted that there was no evidence that the fingerprints recorded by
the system could be used in criminal or workplace investigations, other
than those involving time of arrival and departure. 87
Similarly, the General Counsel refused to issue a complaint in a case
where the employer replaced a two-way radio system in employee vehicles with a computer unit containing a Global Positioning System
(GPS).88 The Roadway Express case is a troubling application of the unilateral change doctrine. A GPS is far more intrusive than a two-way radio
as it allows the company to track each move of the truck as it happens.
The company can determine the truck's route, the length of time a trip
takes and how long a break the driver takes. The General Counsel found
the systems to be the same because both use a mechanical method of
obtaining the same information. 89 According to the General Counsel, the
only difference was whether the employer or the employee initiated the
use of the system for reporting.90 In fact, however, it is a change from
time-specified radio reports to at least potential constant employer monitoring. Thus the correct analogy is a change from supervisory monitoring of work, which is not constant, but initiated on occasion by the
employer, to constant monitoring by video surveillance, which the Board
has found negotiable. One could also analogize it to the change from
supervisory investigation of theft to use of hidden security cameras to
detect theft, also negotiable.91 Since the Board has found employee pri-

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Vincent Industrial Plastics, 328 NLRB 300 (1999).
Id. at 300, n. 1.

Res-Care, Inc., 2001 NLRB Lexis 397.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *23-*24.

Roadway Express, Inc., Case No. 13-CA-39940-1 (2002).
Id.
Id.

See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 NLRB at 519.
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vacy to be a condition of employment, the greater impact of GPS systems
on privacy should lead to the conclusion that this unilateral change
required bargaining.92
Scope of bargaining issues in the public sector are less straightforward, as federal law applies to federal employees and multiple state laws
govern bargaining at the state and local level. Furthermore, to the extent
that other statutory and constitutional provisions exist which deal with
these subjects, those laws will impact bargaining. While this is also true
in the private sector, in the public sector statutory restrictions on bargaining subjects are more common. In the federal sector, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority held that certain union proposals relating to drug
testing were not negotiable because they interfered with the employer's
rights under statutes and executive orders.93 Other proposals of the union
were negotiable, however, as they impinged on no management rights.94
While many of the privacy-related issues are likely to be conditions
of employment and thus commonly within the description of bargainable
subjects under most public sector statutes, other laws and managerial
rights may limit bargaining. For example, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals recently considered whether Sherburne County Minnesota must
adopt bargaining over a new drug testing policy.95 The court first noted
that the state statute governing drug testing permits collective bargaining
over testing policies so long as the negotiated policies meet or exceed the
statutory requirements and do not conflict with the employee protection
standards in the statute.96 The court then concluded that the drug testing
policy was a subject in which matters of inherent managerial policy,
exempt from bargaining, overlapped with mandatorily negotiable terms
and conditions of employment.97
In cases where there is such an overlap, a two-step process is
required: first, the court must determine whether the policy has
an impact on 'terms and conditions of employment,' and second,
if it does, the court must ascertain whether the policy's establishment is separate and distinct from its implementation.

92
93

94
95
96
97

For further critical analysis of the decision in Roadway Express, see Herbert, supra note
53, at 10-11.
See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, 'Resolving Drug Issues', (1993) pp. 141-142, citing
'Department of the Army, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chem. Command', 30
FLRA, No. 115, 1988.
Id., p. 142.
Law Enf't Lab. Serv. v. Sherburne Co., 695 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. App. 2005).
Id., p. 634.
Id., p. 634-636.
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If the establishment and the implementation are not separate and
distinct, implementation is not subject to mandatory bargaining .... But if establishment and implementation are separate and
distinct, implementation is subject to bargaining.(citations omitted).98

The court determined that the establishment of the policy was an inherent managerial right that did not require bargaining and that no bargaining was required over the employee classifications subject to testing.99
Nevertheless, there were other areas of implementation that were separable from the establishment of the program and thus, subject to negotiations.100
A similar decision was reached in a California case involving a
request to bargain over the impact of the installation of a new security
monitoring system.101 After a homicide at the facility, the employer
adopted a new system to keep track of employees and visitors.102 The
new system required employees upon entry and exit to use a personal ID
number, typing it on a keypad or swiping an ID card, and also to touch a
fingerprint scanner. The administrative law judge rejected the employer's
argument that the "system was a non-negotiable upgrade of the existing
system."103 The judge noted, based on precedent, that bargaining over the
decision to install the equipment was not required. The judge concluded,
however, that the employer was required to bargain over the impact of the
decision on the employees including, but not limited to, the privacy
effects of storage of the fingerprints of employees and union representatives, the possibility of discipline as a result of use of the system, and the
impact of delays at entry points on compensable employee hours. 104 The
decision became final because no exceptions were filed, but is not precedential.105 The analysis in these two decisions exemplifies the way many
public-sector agencies are likely to treat employer policies and practices
that implicate privacy, requiring, at a minimum, bargaining over the
impact on terms and conditions of employment unless clearly excluded
from bargaining by the legislature. In some states, bargaining over the

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id., p. 635.
Id., p. 636.
Id., pp. 636-637.
See California St. Employees Ass 'n v. California Youth Authority, 23 PERC
P30114 (1999), aff'd without exceptions, 23 PERC (LRP) P30149 (1999).
All facts are taken from the opinion of the administrative law judge.
Id.
Id.
23 PERC (LRP) P 30149 (1999).

(LRP)
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decision may not be required because it is considered inherently managerial.106 Drug testing as a bargaining subject has been addressed by more
states than other privacy-related issues. Grodin, Malin and Weisberger
report that state and local jurisdictions vary on whether drug testing of
employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining.101
Because of constitutional limitations on employers in the public sector, another question arises for unions there. Can the union bargain away
the employees' constitutional rights? Existing cases have mixed results,
some holding such a waiver is permissiblel08 and others finding to the
contrary.109 In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., the court suggested that
the union's agreement to drug testing in the collective bargaining agreement affected the employees' expectations of privacy.110 Under this
rationale, the union may limit the employees constitutional rights without
a direct waiver. Also, in the federal sector, the Civil Service Reform Act
may limit employees to the contractual grievance procedure for constitutional and statutory privacy claims.111

106 See, e.g., City of Syracuse, 14 NYPERB P4645 (1981) (finding management had right
to install video surveillance cameras without negotiating with the union). See also
Roswell Park Cancer Institute, 34 NYPER (LRP) P4582 (2001 ), ajf'd, 34 NYPER
(LRP) P3040 (2001) (finding no duty to bargain where security cameras are used for
monitoring broader group than just employees and there is no indication that employees
are threatened with discipline or must participate in surveillance).
107 J. R. Grodin et al., Public Sector Employment: Cases and Materials, 2004, p. 229. The
authors note, however, widespread agreement that testing of applicants is not a mandatory bargaining subject. Id.
108 See Bolden v SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 826-29 (3d Cir. 1991) (indicating that union may
consent to drug testing that implicates employees' Fourth Amendment rights so long as
union does not breach its duty of fair representation) and cases cited therein; Geffre v.
Metro. Council, 174 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Minn. 2001) (same).
109 See Anonymous Fireman v. Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 415 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (allowing HIV testing but finding union cannot waive employee's constitutional right through
collective bargaining).
110 863 F.2d 111, 119 (!st Cir. 1988).
111 See Whitman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 382 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that court had
no subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims that the FAA violated his constitutional right of privacy and his statutory right to nondiscriminatory drug testing
because the FAA personnel system incorporated the civil service requirement that the
collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure would be the exclusive remedy
for matters within its coverage unless the matter was excluded by the contract or fell
within a statutory exception), cert. granted, 2005 U.S. Lexis 5032 (June 27, 2005). The
Federal Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have both held that the collective bargaining
agreement is exclusive only as to administrative and not judicial claims, leading to the
circuit split that prompted the grant of certiorari in Whitman. See Asociacion de
Empleados de! Area Cana/era v. Panama Canal Comm 'n, 329 F.3d 1235 (I Ith Cir.
2003); Mudge v. United States, 308 F.3d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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BARGAINING OVER PRIVACY

It appears that both public and private sector unions have the right to
demand bargaining over many issues impacting employee privacy. But
are they? Evidence is somewhat limited.

4.1. Privacy Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements
A 1992 Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey investigated privacy provisions
in 614 collective bargaining agreements, covering 1000 or more workers
each.112 Of the 614 contracts, 380 contained some reference to privacy.113
While this suggests significant focus on privacy in collective bargaining,
a closer look at the classifications used reveals that the study employed a
very broad definition of privacy provisions. A review of the survey data
suggests that many areas of privacy were addressed in a limited way, or
not at all, in the agreements studied. To be classified as containing a privacy provision, the contract had to have one or more of the following: 1.
a requirement of notice that information was being placed in the employee's personnel file; 2. a restriction on the use of employee records; 3. a
right to access and comment on employee personnel records; 4. a provision for confidentiality of employee records or files; or 5. one or more
particular limitations on substance abuse testing.114
The notice and access requirements have limited impacts on the
employee privacy concerns considered here. Further, the most common
provisions were those protecting the use of employee records, primarily
disciplinary records.115 Most of those contract clauses dealt with warnings and notices of discipline placed in employee files.J 16 The second
most common privacy provision related to substance abuse plans and
employee assistance programs, more directly relevant to current employee privacy concerns.111

112 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Privacy Provisions in Major
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1992', Bulletin, No. 2448, 1994. There are several
obvious limitations on this data. It is 13 years old, it encompasses only the private sector, and includes only large collective bargaining units. Id.
113 Id., p. 3.
114 Id. at 3. The study also classified as privacy provisions restrictions on discrimination
based on sexual orientation and marital status, and prohibitions on sexual harassment.
Id., pp. 44-45.
115 Id., p. 4.
116 Id., p. 5.
117 Id. One hundred and four contracts safeguarded privacy in substance abuse programs.
Id., p. 28.
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Ninety contracts contained clauses relating to confidentiality of
employment records, many relating to access to information in connection with investigation and processing of employee grievances.11 s Eightyone dealt specifically with medical records.119 Some provisions required
only employee access to records, however, while others limited the
employer's ability to engage in medical testing.120
Seventy-eight contracts limited employer surveillance, but only 17 of
those contained provisions dealing with electronic monitoring.121
Fourteen of the 17 dealt with telephone monitoring.122 The report suggests that the limited focus on electronic monitoring might be a result of
union emphasis on protective legislation rather than bargaining or the relative lack of surveillance at the time.123 Professor Finkin suggests another explanation: monitoring is more likely to affect white-collar employees, managers and supervisors, who are less frequently unionized. 124 No
more recent comprehensive data was located, 12s but monitoring has cer-

118 Id., pp. 18-20. Others required employers to reprimand employees in private. Id., p. 20.
These provisions raise another privacy issue that arises in the unionized workplace.
Employees (and employers) may be concerned about disclosure of private employee information to the union. While the National Labor Relations Act requires the employer to provide to the union information relevant and necessary to bargaining and contract administration, some confidential information need not be disclosed without authorization from the
employee. See, e.g., Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979)(limiting disclosures of
employee test scores); Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 252 NLRB 368 (!980)(finding no
violation where employer refused to supply names of employees partially disabled by pneumoconiosis without employee authorization). But see Dep 't of the Air Force v. Fed 'l Lab.
Rel. Auth., 104 F.3d 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(relying on NLRA authority to order employer to
give union supervisor's disciplinary letter where union showed it needed the letter to determine whether to file a grievance and also finding that the release of the material to the union
under these circumstances was consistent with the Privacy Act). See also supra note 69.
119 Id., p. 21.
120 Id., pp. 25-26.
121 Id., p. 38. The largest group of these dealt with polygraph testing. Id. Fifteen agreements
limited searches of lockers and/or personal belongings. Id. at 42.
122 Id.
123 M. Finkin, op. cit., supra note 14, at 502-503.
124 Id.
125 A BNA survey of 122 unionized employers in 2003 revealed that 66 per cent had a drug
and alcohol policy in their collective bargaining agreement; 55 per cent had a sexual harassment policy; 30 per cent had a smoking policy; 29 per cent had an intemet/e-mail policy;
and 12 per cent had an AIDS/HN policy. See J. Joseph et al., Employer Bargaining
Objectives 2004, BNA, 2004, p. 55 available at <http://ecommercecenter.bna.com/
press/protected/2004ebo.pdf > (last visited July 7, 2005). The survey does not indicate,
however, whether these policies contained any privacy provisions. Fifteen percent of
employers planned to try to strengthen their drug and alcohol policies in upcoming negotiations while 17 per cent wanted to increase smoking restrictions and 6 per cent desired to
strengthen their internet policy. Id., p. 59.
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tainly increased substantially since 1992. 126 Moreover, some of the more
recent monitoring techniques, such as GPS location monitoring, are more
likely to affect blue-collar or unionized employees, such as truckdrivers
and other delivery people.121 The increasing number of NLRB cases
dealing with computer issues suggests also that these issues are becoming more relevant to workers who are, or are seeking to become, unionized.128 Finally, many public-sector employees covered by union contracts utilize computers in their work.
An unscientific review of some union web sites found limited discussion of privacy issues other than drug testing. A 1997 memo on the
website of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) discussed e-mail at work and recommended
negotiation of an e-mail policy "to make sure that the workplace doesn't
tum into an "electronic sweatshop."'129 The article identified several collective bargaining agreements and memoranda of understanding addressing e-mail. Several addressed solely union use of e-mail, authorizing it
with reasonable limitations.130 One provision, in a Newspaper Guild and
Pioneer Press contract, stated: "'To ensure Productivity and good morale,
the Pioneer Press affirms that users of electronic mail and voice mail systems shall have a zone of privacy ... "'131 The AFSCME article described
the provision as allowing the employer to view e-mail or voicemail of
employees based on reasonable cause, such as a lawsuit, suspicion of a
crime, or the need to perform work in the employee's absence, if there
were no other way to obtain the information.132 Further, certain procedur-

126 See supra notes 13-43 and accompanying text.
127 See Technology Issues Outpace Guidance from NLRB. Attorneys Tell ABA Conference,
supra note 3 (union attorney indicates that GPS monitoring is a troubling issue for
unions).
128 See id.; M. H. Malin and H. H. Perritt, Jr., 'The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces', U. Kan. L. Rev., Vol. 49,
2000 p. 1; S. S. Robfogel, 'Electronic Communication and the NLRA: Union Access
and Employer Rights'. Lab. Law., Vol. 16, 2000, p. 231; G. A. Wilcox, 'Section 7 Rights
of Employees and Union Access to Employees: Cyber Organizing', Lab. Law., Vol. 16,
2000, p. 253; Guard Publishing Co., 2002 NLRB Lexis 70 (2002)(finding that employer violated NLRA by discriminatory rule prohibiting use of e-mail for union purposes
and by insisting on contract proposal that would codify discriminatory rule); Computer
Associates, lnt'l, Advice Memorandum, l-CA-38933 (2001) (authorizing issuance of a
complaint against employer's maintenance of rule prohibiting all non-business use of email, internet and intra-net).
129 AFSCME, E-mail at Work, available at <http://www.afscme.org/wrkplace/cbr397_2.htm>
(visited April 19, 2005).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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al steps, including notification of the employee were required before
review.133 In addition, the provision noted that any enforcement of the
policy that resulted in discipline would be subject to the contractual just
cause standard.134
The National Education Association Office of Higher Education also
has addressed the issue of e-mail privacy, recommending negotiation of
a policy to protect employees.135 At the time of the article, however, no
NEA higher education contracts dealing with e-mail privacy were found,
although several addressed use of e-mail by the union.136 The
Communications Workers of America's web site indicates that the union
has negotiated limitations on electronic monitoring.137 The Newspaper
Guild's Model Contract suggests a provision regarding electronic monitoring which states:
There shall be no secret surveillance of employees nor shall
electronic supervisors, tape recordings, telephone monitoring
systems, monitoring of employees' electronic files or voice mail,
or similar procedures or devices be used. 138
No indication of the number of contracts containing such provisions
exists. The Model Contract also recommends a clause on outside activities, which states: 'Outside Activity. Employees shall be free to engage in
any activities outside of working hours.'139 Again, however, there is no
indication of the number of contracts containing such provisions. The
National Association of Government Employees' agreement with the
Federal Aviation Administration explicitly bars discipline for off-duty
conduct unless it 'hampers his/her effectiveness as an employee or affects
the public's confidence in the Agency.'140 The contract also pro-

133 Id.
134 Id.
135 'E-mail and Privacy', NEA Update, Vol. 2, No. 6, October 1996, available at
http://www.2.nea.org/he/heupdate/v2n06.pdf (last visited September 29, 2005).
136 Id.
13 7 Communications Workers of America, Verizon East Bargaining Briefing Paper,
<http://www.cwa-union.org/verity_search_results.cfm> (visited April 29, 2005).
138 The Newspaper Guild, U.S. Model Contract, Article XXN- General Provisions, available
at <http://www.newsguild.org/barg/display.php?storyID= 148> (visited April 29, 2005).
139 Id.
140 National Agreement Between the Nat'I Ass'n of Gov't Employees, SEIU/AFL-CIO and
the Fed'! Aviation Administration, Dep't of Transportation, Article 5, Section 6, February
25, 2004, available at <http://www.faa.gov/ahr/policy/agree/agrees/term/nage/nage l .cfm>
(last visited September 29, 2005). This provision is similar to the test applied by arbitrators under a just cause requirement. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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tects the confidentiality of medical information of employees with AIDS
or HIV.141
Additional anecdotal evidence indicates that some unions and
employers are negotiating provisions relating to electronic monitoring.
An article regarding GPS-equipped cell phones used by employers to
track employees indicates that 500 employees of the city of Chicago
carry such phones to 'increase their productivity.' 142 The article indicates
that the unions representing the employees obtained several limitations
on the use of these devices, including permitting the employees to shut
down the tracking features during lunch breaks and after work hours.1 43
The Teamsters and UPS, and the City of Orlando and its police union,
reportedly have negotiated about employer use of GPS technology.144
Some federal sector unions reportedly have negotiated policies relating to
personal use of phones and computers, along with agreements on video
surveillance.145 The California State Employees Association has negotiated with the state about electronic entry and exit monitoring systems in
correctional facilities, one using fingerprints.146
Drug testing has been a focus for unions for a longer period of time
than electronic monitoring. There are numerous NLRB casesl47 and arbitration decisionsl48 relating to drug testing. In particular, unions in the
construction industry have addressed drug testing, perhaps because many

141 Id. at Article 41, Section 3. The contract also extensively addresses substance abuse,
including privacy issues. Id. at Articles 36, 37 and 38.
142 B. Chamy, Big Boss is Watching, CNET News.com, available at <http://
news.com.com/Big+boss+is_watching/2100-1036_3-53 79953 .html?part=rss&tag=5>
(last visited May 2, 2005).
143 Id.
144 See 'Employee Tracking Technology Raises Privacy Concerns and Potential Employee
Backlash', Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 80, April 27, 2004. Another report indicates that
after negotiations the City of Orlando rejected the use of tracking devices, while the
Teamsters and UPS agreed to prohibit monitoring on employees' personal time. See
'Employer Use of GPS Units in Work Vehicles, Cell Phones, Stirs Employee Privacy
Concerns', Gov 't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Vol. 42, 2071 (August 17, 2004). The
Teamsters have also barred use of GPS technology to study efficiency or set time standards. Id.
145 See 'As Employee Monitoring Expands, Attention Turns to Information, Policies', Lab.
Rel. Wk. (BNA), Vol. 19, No. 11 (March 17, 2005) (reporting on comments by union
attorney David Kelly).
146 See California State Employees Ass 'n v. California Youth Authority, 23 PERC (LRP)
P30114 (1999).
147 Developing Labor Law, op. cit., supra note 63, at pp. 1214-1215 and nn. 311-318.
148 See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, (6th ed.), Alan Miles Ruben,
Ed. in Chief, 2003, pp. 947-48, 1005-1012; C. L. Redel and A. Abbey, 'The Arbitration
of Drug Use and Testing in the Workplace', Arb. J., Vol. 48, No. 1, March 1993, p. 80.
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employees work on government contracted projects covered by the Drug
Free Workplace Act. In addition, as noted by Sheet Metal Workers Local
36,
The facts about drug and alcohol use are sobering to those of us
in the construction industry. Someone under the influence faces
twice the risk of on-the-job injury as a clear headed worker; construction workers are more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol
than any other employee group; and the industry has a higher onthe-job injury rate.149
Many construction union apprenticeship programs prominently require
drug testing for applicants.150 Some unions have negotiated or adopted
detailed drug testing prograrns.151 The IBEW instituted drug testing for
all of its officers and management personnel in 2005 after negotiating an
agreement with the National Electrical Contractors' Association requiring local unions to 'institute minimum standards providing for drug-free
pools of construction workers nationwide, through voluntary screening

149 See Labor Management Partnership, Sheet Metal Air Conditioning Contractors
Association
and
Sheet
Metal
Workers
Local
36,
available
at
<http://www.sheetmeta136.org/LABOR%20AND%20MANAGEMENT%20PARTNERSHIP.htm > (Last visited May 2, 2005). In 1999, the union approved a new drug
testing program requiring initial testing of all members and continued random and cause
testing. Id. Apprenticeship applicants are also tested. Id.
150 See, e.g., West Virginia Construction Craft Laborers' Apprenticeship Program, available
at <http://www.wvccl.org/apprenticeship.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005); Bridge,
Structural and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local No. 1, available at <http://www.iwlocal1.com/local_l_information.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005). See also Apprenticeship
Programs with the Union Building Trades, available at <http://www.thehighschoolgraduate.com/editorial/AC/ACtrades.htm> (last visited May 2, 2005) (informing readers of
apprenticeship opportunities with 15 different building trades unions which require
applicants to be drug free because '[n]umber one, it's the law. Secondly, worksites can
be dangerous enough without impairment due to drug abuse. Lastly, property owners
and contractors along with the Union Building Trades maintain a zero tolerance for drug
abuse among the workforce.')
151 See, e.g., Management and Unions Serving Together Drug Testing Policy, available at
<http://www.must.org/formsanddocs/mustdrugtesting_081204.pdf> (last visited May
2, 2005) (detailing drug testing policy of an organization composed of unions and construction contractors in southeastern Michigan and specifying confidentiality provisions); MMC Chosen to Administer Substance Abuse Program, Promote Safety at Ohio
Construction Sites, (January 2003) available at http://www.estetacommunications.com/
NewsReleases/Cleveland.htm >(last visited May 2, 2005) (describing substance abuse
program implemented by the Union Construction Industry Partnership (UCIP), a joint
labor-management cooperative, to advance construction safety and implement a drugfree workplace).
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of j oumeymen and apprentices.' I 52 The union indicated an intent to negotiate about drug testing with its own unionized employees in the upcoming contract negotiations.153 Project Labor Agreements negotiated for
large construction projects may contain drug testing requirements also.154
4.2. Privacy in Arbitration

Virtually all collective bargaining agreements contain a grievance and
arbitration procedure to resolve disputes arising under the agreement.
Arbitrators have confronted privacy issues even where there is no contract provision directly addressing the subject. Most commonly, the
issues arise where employees are disciplined or discharged and their challenge to the employer's action alleges a violation of privacy rights. In
some cases, unions argue that arbitrators should suppress evidence
obtained through searches that would violate the Fourth Amendment,
even in the private sector where it does not directly apply.155 In addition,
some arbitrations involve unilaterally-issued employer rules that impact
employee privacy, challenged by unions as unreasonable under the collective bargaining agreement.156 Like the courts, arbitrators tend to apply
a balancing test in cases involving privacy, considering the business need
for the employer's action and the protections for employee privacy
rights.157 Another salient factor in these cases is whether the employer
significantly changed working conditions.158 In public-sector arbitrations
implicating privacy, arbitrators use the balancing test utilized in constitutional cases.159

152 '!BEW Implements Drug Testing For Officers, Reps, Management Staff' /BEW
Journal, January/February 2005 available at <http://www.ibew.org/stories/05journal/050I/p19 .htm >(last visited May 2, 2005).
153 Id.
154 See San Diego County Water Authority Project Labor Agreement, available at
<http://www.sdcwa.org/infra/esp-PLA.phtml >(last visited May 2, 2005) (requiring substance abuse testing).
155 See, e.g., Aldens, Inc., Lab.Arb. (BNA), Vol. 58, McGury, 1972, p. 1213 (excluding evidence); Commodity Warehousing Corp., Lab. Arb. (BNA), Vol. 60, Doppelt, 1973, p.
1260 (admitting evidence).
156 The agreement may expressly authorize issuance of reasonable rules but even where it
does not, arbitrators will usually require that rules be reasonable.
157 Elkouri and Elkouri, supra note 148, p. 1153.
158 Id.
159 See id., p. 1155.
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A brief review of arbitral treatment of some particular privacy-related issues will illustrate the role of privacy in arbitration. One group of
cases involves employer efforts to obtain information that employees
deem private. In these cases, most arbitrators will require employees to
turn over information where the employer shows a legitimate need and
the request is neither vague nor overbroad.160 In the public sector, arbitrators may look for a compelling need and a narrowly tailored request
for information.161 Arbitrators do not always reach the same conclusions
in these cases, however, even on similar facts.162
Like cases involving employee information, cases challenging
employer surveillance go both ways depending on the facts. Where the
employer shows a particular need, the surveillance is likely to be upheld
so long as it is not overly intrusive.163 Typically, however, the cases do not
involve specific contractual provisions relating to either privacy or surveillance, but rather challenges to the reasonableness of employer practices or to discipline resulting from surveillance. Employer searches of
employee belongings and/or lockers have been the subject of a number of
arbitrations. The touchstones of such decisions are notice to employees
and reasonableness of the search.164 In these cases, arbitrators may find
an increased expectation of privacy if the employer requires or allows
employees to use their own locks.165
Arbitrators frequently deal with issues relating to drug and alcohol
testing.166 Where tests are not properly conducted, discipline is commonly set aside.167 When an employer unilaterally adopts random drug testing, arbitrators will typically apply a reasonableness analysis to determine whether random testing is justified and whether to uphold
discipline based on such tests.168 If the job is safety-sensitive and there is
evidence of a serious drug problem, random testing is more likely to be

160 Seeid.,pp.1153-1155.
161 See id., p. 1155.
162 See id., pp. 1156-1157 (discussing cases reaching different results on whether employers can require employees to wear name tags where union challenged the requirement
on privacy grounds).
163 See id., pp. 1157-1159.
164 See id., pp. 1161-1164.
165 Id., p. 1162. One arbitrator even upheld a search of an employee's residence authorized
by his ex-wife who had control over it at the time. Id., p. 1164.
166 For a thorough review of issues relating to drugs and alcohol in the workplace, see F.
Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, Resolving Drug Issues, 1993.
167 Elkouri and Elkouri, supra note 148, p. I 006.
168 Id., pp. 1007-1008. Results of the cases differ, however, even on similar facts. See F.
Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 166, pp. 233-235.
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upheld.169 Arbitrators have also required employees to provide information to their employers about prescription drugs they are taking based on
the employer's interest in ensuring workplace safety and ensuring that
drug test results are accurate.170
Off-duty conduct is also frequently the subject of arbitration, usually under provisions requiring just cause for discipline. The standard treatment is to limit discipline to situations where the employer can demonstrate that the conduct impacts the employer's business.17 1 Such a rule
limits the control that the employer retains over the employee's private
life. In some jobs, notably in the education sector, arbitrators have
engaged in heightened scrutiny of the employees' private lives because of
the nature of the job, finding termination warranted more frequently.172
This review of arbitral authority indicates that even where unions
have not negotiated privacy provisions in collective bargaining agreements, they will utilize privacy arguments in challenging discipline under
just cause provisions or in challenging employer-implemented rules.
Privacy arguments are accepted by arbitrators where employers cannot
show a substantial need to invade employee privacy. Thus, while it
appears that specific privacy provisions have not been extensively incorporated in collective bargaining agreements, unions have utilized privacy
arguments to challenge employer rules and employee discipline that
impacts on privacy rights.
5.

THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

The International Labour Office (ILO) recommends the involvement of
workers' representatives in matters relating to employee privacy, including collection of personal data and electronic monitoring.173 The Council
of Europe makes a similar recommendation for its members, but there is

169 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 148, pp. 1008-1010.
170 See F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 166, pp. 75-79.
171 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, supra note 148, pp. 938-939. See, e.g., 'Champion lnt'I',
Lab. Arb. (BNA), Vol. 96, Statham, 1991, p. 325, (reinstating employee who pied guilty
to off-duty drug dealing because there was no nexus to employment despite substance
abuse policy and rule authorizing discipline for criminal conviction that reflects unfavorably on company or employee involved).
172 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, op. cit., supra note 148, pp. 1311-1314. The test does not
differ but because education employees are viewed as role models for students, their offduty conduct is more frequently deemed to have affected the job.
173 J. T. Aranda, 'Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: The Role of Worker
Representatives', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J., Vol. 23, 2002, pp. 533-535.
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no binding treaty provision so requiring.174 In several European Union
member states, however, the law requires involvement of worker representatives where employers undertake certain actions that impact
employee privacy. Germany, Italy, Spain, and France all require either
notice or consultation or both when the employer installs or changes systems for worker surveillance,175 as do Sweden, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. t 76 France, Germany and Italy have particularly stringent
requirements for consultation. If the works council in France is not consulted about monitoring, it is a criminal offense. 177 If notice to the
employee and consultation of the works council have not occurred, any
information gathered is invalid and cannot be used as proof of any
wrongdoing by the employee.178 German law prohibits collection of data
regarding employee phone calls and e-mails unless the employee or the

174 Id. The European Commission is planning to issue a directive on protection of workers'
personal data in 2005, after having consulted with the social partners, employer and
union federations, on the issue in 2001 and 2002. See Commission Issues Five-Year
Social Agenda (February 2005), available at <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2005/02/feature/eu0502205f.html > (last visited September 30, 2005); A. Broughton, Commission
Issues Second Stage Consultation on Data Protection, available at <http://
www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/1 l/feature/eu0211206f.html>, (last visited September 30,
2005). This directive would supplement existing general directives on the processing of
personal data which apply to the workplace but do not specifically address workplace
issues. See C. Delbar, M. Mormont and M. Schots, New Technology and Respect for
Privacy at the Workplace, (2003, available at <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/
2003/07/study/tn0307l01 s.html>, (last visited September 30, 2005). The suggested
framework proposed by the EC at the second stage consultation included a provision that
worker representatives be consulted before installation, modification or evaluation of any
system of employee surveillance. See id.
175 See J. T. Aranda, supra note 173, pp. 536-537; A. L. Goldman, 'Overview and U.S.
Perspective', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, p. 1. Finnish law also requires
employers to inform employees of electronic monitoring and discuss the monitoring
with those employees, while substantially restricting such monitoring by law. A.
Suviranta, 'The Impact of Electronics on Labor Law in Finland', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y
J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 93-107.
176 C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174. In the Netherlands, the Works Council has a
veto power on any changes in personal data collection or employee monitoring. Id.
Luxembourg requires co-determination by a joint committee regarding any technical
equipment used to monitor employees. Id. In Sweden, negotiation is required on any
changes in matters involving personal integrity, such as medical tests, and those involving information and communication technology. Id.
177 J.-E. Ray and J. Rojot, 'A Comparative Study of the Impact of Electronic Technology on
Workplace Disputes', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol 'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 117-134.
178 Id. The collective agreement cannot waive the statutory protections. Id., pp. 133-134.
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union consents.179 No collective bargaining agreement can supersede the
law unless it 'observes statutory provisions and especially the obligation
of both social partners to protect and promote the free development of the
personality of the employees.'180 In Germany, the employer also must pay
for expert advice for the union if it is necessary to understand any new
system.181 The German law provides the union and the employer with
significant authority over the privacy protection available to employees.182 In Italy, an agreement with the local union must precede installation of video surveillance for security or productivity purposes.183 If a
union is set up after the installation, the union must agree to retaining the
system.184 Failure to comply subjects the employer to a criminal sanction.185
In the United Kingdom, the legislation does not require consultation
but the Employment Practices Data Protection Code issued by the
Information Commissioner recommends consultation with trade unions
over any practice that involves employees' personal data.186 While
Belgium has no specific legal requirement of consultation with worker
representatives on privacy issues created by new technologies, existing
general law and practice would require information and consultation.187
These laws and regulations provide opportunities for worker representatives to influence the employer's adoption and application of technology
that impacts worker privacy.188

179 A. Roeland, 'A Comparative Study of the Impact of Electronic Technology on
Workplace Dispute: National Report on Germany', Comp. Lab. L. & Poly J., Vol. 24,
2002, pp. 147, 165-166.
180 Id., p. 166.
181 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 536.
182 Id.
183 P. Balboni, 'Video Surveillance and Related Privacy and Data Protection Issues: The
Italian Experience', to be published in Reasonable Expectations of Privacy? Eleven
Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy, S. Nouwt, B. R. de
Vries and C. Prins (eds.), 2005, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=721422#PaperDownload >, p. 20.
184 Id., p. 22.
185 Id.
186 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 537.
187 R. Blanpain, 'Some Belgian and European Aspects', Comp. Lab. L. & PolyJ., Vol. 24,
2002, pp. 47, 63, 64.
188 See M. Rustad and S. R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail And Internet Usage:
Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshops: Insights from Europe, available at
<http://lsr.nellco.org/suffolk/ip/papers/6>, 2005, p. 48 (noting that the right to privacy
for European workers is 'inextricably linked with the development of trade unions,
worker self-control and self-determination).
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Legislation in Europe also provides for union representation of
employees challenging invasions of privacy. A European Community
Directive 'requires that: "Each [national] supervisory authority shall hear
claims lodged by any person, or by an association representing that person, concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the
processing of personal data. . .. " (emphasis added)' 189 The laws of
Germany and Italy make similar provisions for workers to be aided by
works council members and associations, respectively.190 Unions in
Belgium also have such representation rights.191
Finally, some collective bargaining agreements in other countries
deal with privacy issues.192 Australian unions in some industries have
negotiated limitations on employer surveillance of employee computer
use.193 In New Zealand, the introduction of new technology is negotiable
and some collective agreements have incorporated provisions relating to
the subject.194 A 2003 report on technology and privacy in the European
Union reports that multi-employer bargaining on the issue is not common, citing agreements in Belgium, Norway and Denmark as the exceptions.195 Collective agreements at the workplace level are not unusual,
however.196 The study notes that such bargaining is occurring not only in
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and
Sweden, all of which have legislation or central agreements requiring at
least some consultation, but also in Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom.197
In Belgium, the national collective agreement, which applies to all
private employers, governs employee privacy and online communications

189 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 539. The Council of Europe and the ILO make
similar recommendations. Id., pp. 539-540.
190 Id., p. 540.
191 R. Blanpain, op. cit., supra note 187, p. 64.
192 See J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, at 538-539 (describing the Belgian National
Agreement on video surveillance and the recommendation of the French National
Commission for Computer Technologies and Personal Freedom that privacy concerns
relating to computers be negotiated between employers and unions).
193 R. McCallum and A. Steward, 'The Impact of Electronic Technology on Workplace
Disputes in Australia', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'yl., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 19, 39-40.
194 J. M. Howells, 'Electronic Technology and Workplace Issues: The New Zealand
Situation', Comp. Lab. L. & Pol 'y J., Vol. 24, 2002, pp. 225, 240-241. The contract provisions discussed in the article do not focus on privacy issues, however, and the law in
New Zealand does not limit employer monitoring in any significant way, except for a
notice requirement. See id., pp. 234-35, 240.
195 C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174.
196 Id.
197 Id. The exact number of such agreements is unknown, but the report cites examples of
specific agreements in France and Spain. Id.
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data.198 Detailed information regarding monitoring or control must be
provided to the workers' representatives or in the absence of a representative, to the workers themselves. 199 The only legitimate reasons for such
action are the following: 1. 'Prevention of unacceptable or slanderous
acts . . . ; ' 2. Protecting the employer's confidentiality interests; 3.
Protection of the information technology network; or 4. '[B]onafide control of the policy rules' of the employer concerning use of technology.200
Additionally, the employer's control must not interfere with the employees' private lives any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate purposes of the employer.20 1 The agreement also strictly limits the employer's use of data to identify individuals sending or receiving electronic
communications. 202
In Norway, the central 'basic agreement' contains a supplementary
agreement on monitoring which requires notice and discussion with the
union, bars discrimination in monitoring, and mandates consultation with
the union regarding the handling of information received through monitoring.203 The Danish trade union confederation and the confederation of
employers also negotiated a supplement requiring notice of new monitoring controls.204 In addition, the social partners in the European Union
have negotiated a framework for telecommuting workers which contains
provisions regarding worker privacy and limitations on employer monitoring of workers.205 This agreement will be implemented by the trade
unions and employers, rather than by EU Directive.206
Though some variations exist, many of the countries discussed have
much broader legal protection for privacy than the u.s.201 and, in addition, provide for an important consultative role for worker representatives
on matters relating to employee privacy. The legislative and collectively

198
199
200
201
202
203
204

R. Blanpain, op. cit., supra note 187, p. 60.
Id., p. 62.
Id., p. 61.
Id.
Id., p. 63.
C. Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174.
Id. There is also a general provision in the national agreement in Greece recognizing
employee rights to privacy. Id.
205 A. Broughton, Social Partners Sign Teleworking Accord, available at
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/07 /feature/eu0207204 f.html>, (last visited
September 30, 2005).
206 Id.
207 See M. Rustad and S. R. Paulsson, op. cit., supra note 188, pp. 51-89 (discussing
European legislation and noting the importance of privacy as a fundamental human right
in Europe which is protected without distinction between public and private workplaces); Delbar et al., op. cit., supra note 174, (discussing privacy legislation at the
European Community and national level).
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bargained provisions enable labor organizations in these countries to play
a proactive role in shaping the employer's privacy policy within the limits of the law.

6.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A VEHICLE FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
FOR

U.S.

EMPLOYEES

Can collective bargaining play a greater role in privacy protection for
employees in the United States? First, it is important to recognize the role
that collective bargaining has played to date. While there does not appear
to be widespread negotiation of privacy provisions in collective bargaining agreements, contractual privacy protection has developed for unionized employees through arbitration. Such protection is comparable to the
constitutional protection available in the public sector. Unions have contested employee discipline and challenged employer rules and practices
on privacy grounds. They have established some general rules regarding
privacy that are typically applied by arbitrators interpreting general provisions in collective bargaining agreements, to the benefit of represented
employees. In interpreting agreements, arbitrators balance the employer's
legitimate business needs with the employees' privacy interests. These
arbitral principles then shape the future conduct of unionized employers
dealing with privacy issues. In this time of shrinking, and thus weaker
unions, arbitration under contractual just cause provisions and reasonable
rule requirements may be the best vehicle available for protecting the privacy of employees represented by unions.
The limitation of this approach is its lack of predictability.
Arbitrators are not bound by precedent and, as seen above, arbitrators
may reach different determinations on similar facts. Thus, without predictable rules, employees may be uncertain of their rights. This uncertainty may lead employees to permit privacy infringements out of fear oftermination, or to risk discharge without sufficient information as to the
probability that a termination will be upheld in arbitration. Thus, at least
in some cases, the protection may be more theoretical than real.
To combat this problem, unions could increase their efforts to negotiate explicit contractual privacy protections, supplementing the reactive
approach to privacy with a more proactive one. Collective determination
of privacy protections has some significant advantages. Collectively-bargained privacy provisions, with or without enhanced legal regulation, can
be targeted at the issues most relevant to the particular workplace and the
privacy concerns of the employees in the bargaining unit. Negotiation of
privacy protections can provide employers with the flexibility necessary
to operate in their particular markets, while ensuring the protection of
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employee privacy interests.2os As noted above, there are a wide range of
privacy issues affecting workers - from computer monitoring to genetic
testing to off-duty smoking bans. Some may be of little importance to
workers in a particular workplace while others may be of vital interest.
The union can identify and address those issues of importance and trade
off in bargaining those that are not. In addition, unions and employers can
respond to changes in technology more quickly than legislatures, dealing
collectively with new issues raised by rapidly evolving technologies.209
Furthermore, litigation pursuant to legislation is a time-consuming and
expensive method of protecting employee rights. Collective action,
through bargaining, provides an alternative method of protecting privacy
that requires fewer resources from the employee, employer and government. Thus the goal of privacy protection may be achieved more efficiently.
Is collective bargaining a substitute for enhanced privacy legislation
or a supplement to such legislation?2IO Initially, it should be noted that

208 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, pp. 538-539.
209 Id. For example, after a security breach involving identifiable information of employees
at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Treasury Employees Union,
which represents almost 5000 FDIC employees, demanded additional assistance from
the agency for employees to prevent and respond to identity theft. See 'FDIC Informs
Employees of Data Breach; Union Seeks Better ID Theft Assistance', Gov 't Employee
Rel. Rep. (BNA), Vol. 43, at p. 43 (June 28, 2005).
210 Unions should be aware that by negotiating privacy protections, they may in some cases
waive employee rights to judicial action. In the private sector, the Supreme Court has
not ruled on whether the union can waive employee rights, but has held that for such a
waiver to be effective, it must be clear and unequivocal. Wright v. Universal Maritime
Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70(1998). Only the Fourth Circuit has found such a waiver. See,
e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that collective bargaining agreement's provisions 'clearly and unmistakably' waived the employee's right to litigate her sex discrimination claim in court). The majority of courts have
declined to find union waivers of employee rights to litigation. See, e.g., Rogers v. New
York University, 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000); Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. Northwest Air Lines,
Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Bratten v. SS! Servs. Inc., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir.
1999). Public employers, like private employers, have attempted to limit judicial litigation of statutory claims based on collective bargaining agreements, with limited success.
See R. J. Kramer, 'Wright or Wrong: Can Employers and Unions Waive an Employee's
Right to a Judicial Forum for Statutory Claims', Urban Lwyr., Vol. 36, 2004, pp. 825,
832-836. In the federal sector, however, under the Civil Service Reform Act, judicial
action may be precluded where a collective bargaining agreement covers the dispute
unless the action falls within one of the statutory exceptions or unless the collective bargaining agreement excludes the matter from the grievance procedure. See 5 U.S.C. §
7121; Whitman v. Dep 't ofTransp., 382 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2004). While Whitman found
that the court had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's constitutional privacy claim because
it was covered by his collective bargaining agreement, the circuits are split on the issue
and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Whitman to resolve the issue. 2005 U.S.
Lexis 5032 (June 27, 2005).
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employers are not required to bargain with unions regarding hiring practices so that collective bargaining is unlikely to protect the privacy rights
of applicants for employment. Nor will it protect managers and supervisors. Thus, many individuals will not be protected by negotiated privacy
protections. Yet passage of comprehensive privacy legislation seems
unlikely. Additionally, even narrower legislation relating to workplace
privacy has failed to pass at the federal level and in most states. While
repeated revelations of privacy invasions outrage the public for a time,
most recently the Choicepoint scandal, the push for protection, particularly at the workplace level, is generally insufficient to move legislation
forward. In addition, there is an anti-regulatory political climate present
in the U.S. today that does not bode well for privacy legislation. Critics
of regulation argue, inter alia, that extensive regulation in this era where
businesses need flexibility to respond to rapidly changing market conditions hampers the competitiveness of American business. Increased regulation is one factor influencing the relocation of operations overseas. If
more expansive legal regulation is unlikely, then unions, where they exist,
can provide greater protection for employees than the law currently provides while offering employers the flexibility that may be necessary to
compete in global markets.
Moreover, even in the face of privacy legislation, there is a role for
collective bargaining, as legal regulation necessarily paints with a broad
brush.211 Like the worker representatives in European countries with
stronger privacy legislation, U.S. unions can assist in shaping the specific workplace rules to implement legislative directives. The evidence suggests that more unions are focusing on issues of computer privacy. As
computers become ever more prevalent in the workplace,212 privacy concerns will increase. Proactive participation by labor organizations on the
front end can provide employees a greater voice in setting the terms of
their employment and limiting employer inroads on employees' private
lives. The new frontiers of privacy - computer monitoring, particularly
location monitoring, and off-duty employee blogging - provide avenues
for unions to test their ability to obtain collectively bargained privacy
protections. Instead of merely arbitrating the grievance of the employee
discharged for creating a blog that offends the employer, the union can
negotiate the rules on off-duty blogging. Negotiated rules will provide a
better balance of employer needs and employee rights than those created

211 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, p. 538.
212 As of2001, almost 57 per cent of the workforce aged 25 and over used a computer at work
and almost 42 per cent used the internet and/or e-mail. GAO Report, supra note 33, p. 4.
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unilaterally, since even enlightened employers may be unaware or unconvinced of employee needs and interests.
To the extent that legislation exists, unions can provide assistance to
employees in enforcing their legal rights.213 In general, enforcement of
legal rights is more effective in the unionized workplace because the
union has resources to assist employees and protects employees from
retaliation for asserting their rights. Furthermore, in some areas involving privacy, particularly those relating to technology, professional experts
may be necessary and affordable only with union representation.
One significant limitation to this approach, however, is the shrinking
percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements in the
U.S. Unionization in the private sector is particularly limited. Unions represent such a small percentage of the workforce that even universal negotiation of privacy protections would benefit a fraction of the workforce.
And as unionization has decreased, collective power has decreased also,
making it more difficult for unions to achieve their goals in collective
bargaining. Thus, a desire for more contractual privacy protection may
not be reflected in reality.214 In addition, there is a risk that a weak union
might be forced to sacrifice employee privacy protections available by
statute if the law permits union waiver.215 In the public sector, where
unionization is more prevalent, collectively-bargained privacy protections could have a greater impact. Moreover, more unionized employees
in the public sector are likely to be affected by employer techniques like
computer monitoring. Although public employees have constitutional
privacy protections, contractual privacy rights may be quicker and cheaper to enforce through the grievance and arbitration procedure. In the public sector, however, the right to bargain may be more limited as a result
of statutory provisions.
There is another possible approach to regulation of workplace privacy. In the current political climate there is a trend toward self-regulation,
in the workplace and elsewhere.2 16 If this trend continues, we may see
privacy issues in the workplace addressed through legislative or judicial
provisions that promote self-regulation. As explained by Professor

213 Unions could play a similar role in an expanded regime of common law privacy rights.
See W.R. Corbett, op. cit., supra note 2, pp. 154-159.
214 For example, the UAW mounted a legal challenge on constitutional grounds to a provision in bargaining agreement it negotiated, suggesting that it had insufficient power to
eliminate the clause in negotiations. See supra note 73.
215 Given the very limited protections currently available to private sector employees, however, this is not a significant risk at present.
216 For extensive discussion of this trend, see C. Estlund, 'Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation', Co/um. L. Rev., Vol. 105, 2005, p. 319.
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Estlund, self-regulation can be effective if there are organizations that
serve as monitors.217 A labor organization could participate as an internal monitor where it has representation rights, but Estlund suggests that
unions can also serve as monitors of self-regulation where they do not
represent a majority of the workers.218 Unions might join with organizations dedicated to protecting privacy rights of all citizens to monitor businesses to insure respect for privacy of customers as well as employees. In
addition joint employer-employee committees might serve a monitoring
role in some industries to insure compliance with privacy protections.219
Unions could assist employee committee representatives even without
majority representation rights. While resource limitations may affect the
ability of unions to perform such functions, employees who see the benefit of unions in this context might later become union members or
organize their workplaces.
Does this theoretical expansion of the union role in enforcement of
employee privacy interests show practical promise? Despite the benefits
described, a significantly greater role for collective bargaining in privacy
protection seems somewhat unlikely in the present climate. Private-sector unions are losing members and power. The public sector, where
unionization rates are stable, offers greater promise than the private sector where existing legislation does not limit bargaining rights. The intrusiveness of new technologies in monitoring employees, and the growing
concern about citizen and consumer privacy, may spur unions to put more
emphasis on negotiating privacy protections. In an ideal world, collectively-bargained privacy protections could balance employer needs and
employee interests, providing flexibility to tailor the provisions to fit current conditions and alter them with changing technology. Realistically,
however, collective bargaining will probably continue to play a restricted
role in the privacy arena. Existing protection through arbitration may
remain the primary vehicle for protecting the privacy rights of employees
in the unionized workplace.

217 Id., pp. 355-383.
218 Id., pp. 388-389.
219 J. T. Aranda, op. cit., supra note 173, pp. 537-538.
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